Trends and problems in unemployment insurance (Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations publications. Bulletin series. v.4, no.2) by King, Irving N.

a I E. RARY
OF THE
UN IVLRSITY
Of ILLINOIS
331. 1
vNo. \- 2.5




INSTITUTE OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
TRENDS AND
PROBLEMS IN
UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE
^
NIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
i^
EDITORIAL NOTE
The Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations was established in
1946 to "inquire faithfully, honestly, and impartially into labor-manage-
ment problems of all types, and secure the facts which will lay the
foundation for future progress in the whole field of labor relations."
The Institute seeks to serve all the people of Illinois by promoting
general understanding of our social and economic problems, as well as by
providing specific services to groups directly concerned with labor and
industrial relations.
The Bulletin series is designed to implement these aims by periodi-
cally presenting information and ideas on subjects of interest to persons
active in the field of labor and industrial relations. While no effort is
made to treat the topics exhaustively, an attempt is made to answer the
main questions raised about the subjects under discussion. The presenta-
tion is non-technical for general and popular use.
Additional copies of this Bulletin and others listed on the last page are
available for distribution.
W. Ellison Chalmers Milton Berber
Director Coordinator of Research
Dorothy Dowell
Editor
I.L.I.R. PUBLICATIONS, BULLETIN SERIES, VOL. 4, NO. 2
(formerly Series A)
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN
Volume 48, Number 6; August, 1950. Published seven times each month by the Univer-
sity of Illinois. Entered as second-class matter December 11, 1912, at the post office at
Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Office of Publication, 3S8 Administra-
tion Building, Urbana, Illinois.
-L^IoSj.
I
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
By Irving N. King
Unemployment insurance— popularly known as unemployment com-
pensation— is a recent development in the United States. Within the
last 15 years, the priyiciple of unemployment insurance has come to be
generally accepted. The program of unemployment insurance, however,
is not now and never has been entirely satisfactory to any group in this
country. Many different opinions exist as to how our present system of
unemployment insurance should be changed.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
The original Social Security Act^ was passed by Congress in 1935. A
part of this law provided for a 3% tax on the payrolls of all employers —
with certain exceptions. The law provided, however, that if an employer's
home state enacted an "approved" unemployment insurance law, up to
90% of the amount of such taxes would be retained by the state for the
payment of benefits. To be approved, a state law must comply with
minimum standards outlined in the federal act. Within two years all of
the states* had passed such legislation.
From the first, these state laws varied widely. Within the limits of
broad minimum standards set forth in the federal act, each state may
determine what industries will be covered under its law, how large a tax
shall be collected from employers, the amount of benefits to be paid, and
the way in which the law will be administered.
Nor have the laws remained as they were first enacted. Since 1937 the
Congress and all the state legislatures have made many changes in their
respective laws. While the basic system of unemployment insurance has
remained the same, some of the changes have liberalized and extended
benefits and coverage. Other changes have had the opposite effect.
Still further changes have been proposed by industry, government
officials, organized labor, and other interested groups. These proposals
range from complete federalization of unemployment insurance, through
only slight modification of our present system, to complete state control
of the system. The proposals vary also as to coverage, amount and
duration of benefits, reasons for depriving workers of benefits, financings
and administration.
COVERAGE
The original Social Security Act provided for the exemption of various
groups of employers from the unemployment tax. This had the effect of
* The word "state" as used in this bulletin, includes also the District of Co-
lumbia, Alaska, and Hawaii.
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also excluding their employees from unemployment insurance benefits.
For example, those employers who had fewer than eight people working
for them were not required to pay the tax. The reason given for this
exemption was that the amount of the tax would be small and its collec-
tion a nuisance. Other exemptions were made because it was believed
impossible, for a time after the law first went into effect, to administer a
program that covered all types of employment. Still other exemptions,
such as state employees, were made because it was thought the Constitu-
tion prohibited the federal government from taxing state agencies. Occu-
pations excluded from the insurance program by the federal act were:
1. Agricultural labor
2. Domestic service in a private home
3. Service performed as an officer or member of the crew of a vesseP
4. Service performed by an individual employed by his son, daughter,
or spouse, and service performed by a person under 21 in the
employ of his parents
5. Work for federal, state, and local governments
6. Service performed for non-profit, religious, educational, and chari-
table organizations
7. Self-employed persons
Federal Exemption Changes
Since the passage of the original Social Security Act, Congress has
amended the act both to narrow the coverage and to widen it.
Railroad employers were among the groups that were taxed under
the original act. However, in 1938 Congress enacted a separate law deal-
ing with the payment of unemployment compensation to railroad em-
ployees. This was amended further in 1946 to provide non-occupational
disability benefits for railroad employees.^
In 1939 a series of amendments to the original act were passed. A
part of the act. Title IX, was designated as the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act. The substance of the law remained the same, however — lew-
ing on employers a 3% tax on the first $3,000 paid to each employee.
In the same amendments, agricultural labor was re-defined to exclude
from coverage those persons engaged in the processing and preparation
of agricultural products as well as farm laborers. Coverage was reduced
further by exempting domestic service performed in college fraternities
and sororities.
The most important extension of coverage by Congress came in 1946,
when the maritime industry was included under the Federal Unemploy-
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mcnt Tax Act. Maritime workers were originally excluded because it
was thought that the Constitution prevented the states from taxing this
industry. However, two decisions by the Supreme Court in 1943 were
interpreted to mean that states may tax this industry.*
Most of the states acted immediately after the 1946 amendment to
extend the coverage to maritime workers. In twelve states the coverage
was automatically extended because of provisions in their laws that state
coverage would follow any extension of federal coverage. Forty-six states
now provide some kind of coverage directly or indirectly for maritime
workers, and the states without this coverage have no water traffic of any
importance.'' Illinois covers maritime workers employed on American
vessels who are "supervised, managed, directed and controlled from an
operating office" in Illinois.^
The States and Specific Exemptions
Specific exemptions under the state laws follow closely those in the
federal law. But there are some differences.
The District of Columbia has the only law covering agricultural labor.
But this has very litde meaning since there is little agriculture there. On
the other hand, 26 states exclude from coverage employees of agricul-
tural or horticultural organizations exempt from federal income tax. Six
states have definitions of agricultural labor which cover more persons
than the definition in the federal law. California's law also covers many
agricultural workers not covered by the federal law.
The New York law is the only one which covers domestic service in
private homes; the coverage is limited to households which employ four
or more servants for 15 days in any year. Twelve states cover domestic
service in college clubs, fraternities, and sororities. Wisconsin covers family
employment but only New York covers service by a child under 21 for a
parent. Hawaii partially covers workers in non-profit organizations.
A few of the states cover their own government workers. Some state
employees are covered by the Wisconsin law. New York covers classified
state employees with at least one year of service. New York municipal
corporations or other government subdivisions may elect to pay their own
benefits instead of contributing to the state fund. Since October 1, 1949,
Texas has covered employees of local and state governments. Arizona,
Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, and Tennessee permit election of coverage
for their state and local government employees."
A majority of the state laws, including that of Illinois, have provisions
to automatically extend coverage to additional occupations if and when
such occupations are covered by amendments to the Federal Act.^
Table I
MINIMUM SIZE- OF- FIRM PROVISIONS IN THE STATE LAWS
(September 1, 1949)
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Trend of Coverage
In 1947 the Senate Committee on Finance appointed an Advisory
Council on Social Security. Members of the Council included government
oflficials, business and industrial executives, trade union leaders, and
educators. ^^ In its December, 1948, report, the Council stated, ". . . the
number of individuals in employment covered by the state unemploy-
ment insurance laws has increased markedly in the past ten years." ^- But
during this same period the total civilian labor force has increased while
unemployment has decreased, as shown in Table II on the preceding
page.^^
After 10 years, 53.5% of the total civilian labor force and 55.0% of
those employed were covered by the system.^* Even with this percentage
increase in coverage by the states, only seven out of ten workers em-
ployed by others were covered by unemployment insurance in 1948.^^
Table III
GROUPS EXCLUDED FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE^*'
Persons in Millions
Workers in small firms 3.4
Employees of non-profit organizations 9
Federal employees 1.7
Members of armed forces 1.3
Agricultural workers 1.7
Domestic workers in private homes 1.7
Employees of state and local governments 3.5
Total .14.2
Should unemployment insurance be extended to more workers? Some
say "yes", particularly representatives of organized labor.^' The Advisory
Council on Social Security has stated: "The Council's goal of coverage
in unemployment insurance is the protection of all persons who work
for others and have a recent record of depending on wages for a signifi-
cant part of their support." Yet, "this goal must be obtained gradually."^*
Some groups argue against increased coverage. Those firms and
employers now exempt from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act say
they do not wish to be burdened with the tax. Others say extending un-
employment insurance coverage would cause administrative difficulties,
as for example, extending coverage to agricultural labor. Many farmers
keep poor records, and pay their labor in kind— meals and lodging. And
they say determining when an agricultural laborer is "unemployed" and
when he is "available for work" would present other problems.^'' Those
who argue against extending coverage to federal government workers
say: "Federal workers, during 'normal' times, at least, have compara-
tively secure jobs, and do not 'need' such protection."^^
8
Those who wish coverage extended contend that administrative diffi-
culties can be overcome. They point to the fact that 17 state laws cover
employees working for firms having one or more workers, and that
smaller firms are required to keep accurate records concerning their em-
ployees for other tax purposes. "A system of unemployment insurance,
to be adequate, should provide care for all persons normally attached to
the labor market who become unemployed through no fault of their
own. ... As our system now stands, a significant proportion of the wage
earning population is excluded. . . . Yet they are not less deserving of
or less suited for unemployment insurance protection than their favored
fellow workers."^^
BENEFITS
The Social Security Act did not set up standards for benefits in un-
employment insurance. As a result, state laws vary more widely on this
subject than on any other.^^
All states, however, require that a worker must be eligible during a
"benefit year." This is a period of time during which a worker receives
his benefits. The beginning and ending dates of the benefit year vary
in the different states. A worker must also have been employed during
a period of time— known as the "base period"— before his benefit year
begins.
Qualifying Wage
In all states a worker must have earned a minimum amount of wages
or he must have worked for a certain period of time within his base
period — or both. In 29 states the minimum amount of wages he must
have earned is found by multiplying the weekly benefit amount by a
number stated in the law. In 19 states a worker must have earned a
specified amount in his base period — varying from $100 to $600. In
Illinois the amount is $300. Michigan and Wisconsin require that a per-
son must have worked for a specific number of weeks a7id have earned
at least the minimum wage established. In Ohio a worker must have
earned at least $240 in at least 14 weeks of work. Other states have
different formulas for determining the "qualifying wage."
Waiting Period
The "waiting period" is the period of unemployment in which a
worker receives no benefits even though he is eligible in every other re-
spect. The initial waiting period occurs the first time he applies for bene-
fits. If he applies for benefits more than once during the year, and must
wait each time, the total number of weeks he has been required to wait
is known as the total waiting period.
When the unemployment insurance laws were first passed, two
reasons were given for including a waiting period:
1. It was believed administratively necessary.
2. It was felt that workers who were unemployed for only a short
time should not receive benefits in order to save the money for those
workers who were unemployed for a longer time.
Now, however, some administrators of unemployment insurance say
that a waiting period is no longer administratively important, and because
of the large amount of money in the fund, "saving" it is no longer
necessary.^^
In 1938, the waiting period ranged from three weeks in one year to
two weeks in every 13-week period. Only 10 states limited the total wait-
ing period to four weeks or less in a year.-*
By September, 1949, Maryland and Nevada had done away with the
waiting period entirely. In other states they were considerably reduced.
In 45 states there is an iriitial waiting period of one week; 4 states have
two weeks. Additional waiting periods during the year have been elim-
inated in all states except Texas. That state requires an additional
waiting period when more than 35 days have passed since a person last
received benefits.
Weekly Benefit Amounts
Under all state laws the amount of benefits which a worker receives
for each week of total unemployment varies according to his past wages.
There are minimum and maximum amounts, however. In most states the
law is designed to provide the worker with about one-half of the average
weekly wage he earned when he was working full-time. Eight states
determine the weekly benefit amount from a percentage of annual wages
rather than average weekly wage. In Michigan and Wisconsin weekly
benefit amounts are based on average weekly wages from each employer.
In 1 1 states a worker's dependents are considered in figuring his
weekly benefit amount. By 1945, four states provided for increased allow-
ances for dependents. By 1949, five states had granted additional benefits
to those workers supporting dependents, and during that same year si.x
more states followed. In Connecticut, Mar\4and, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Wyoming only children under 16 or 18
are counted as dependents. In the District of Columbia, Nevada. Alaska,
and Arizona— husbands, wives, parents, brothers, sisters, and children
are considered dependents if they are unable to work for physical reasons
or because of age.
The amount added for each dependent varies from $1 in the District
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of Columbia to $3 in Connecticut, and from $2 to $5 in Alasl^a. There
are, however, statutory limits in each of the 1 1 states for the total benefits
allowed for dependents.^^
In Utah, the weekly benefit amount, within minimum and maximum
limits, is tied to the cost-of-living index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Maximum and Minimum Weekly Benefit Amounts
There has been a steady increase in maximum and minimum benefit
amounts paid during the last ten years. ^^ Twelve years ago the maximum
benefit in all states except two was $15. Wyoming, with $18, and Michi-
gan, with $16, were the two exceptions. As shown in Table IV, $25 is the
most common amount."' Today only Florida retains the $15 maximum.
In Illinois the maximum is $25.
The minimum benefit amounts in the state laws have not risen as
sharply as the maximums. In the first unemployment insurance laws a
majority of the states had a minimum of $5. Only one state had a mini-
mum as high as $8, and three states had a minimum of $7.50.
By September, 1949, $5 was still the most frequent figure. The lowest
minimum of fifty cents, which is found in Missouri, is payable as $3 in
advance with the duration reduced proportionately. Oregon has the
highest minimum with $15. From the summary in Table V, however,
it can be seen that the trend is toward higher minimum benefit amounts.^^
Table IV
NUMBER OF STATES BY SPECIFIED MAXIMUM BENEFIT AMOUNTS
(September 1, 1949)
Maximum benefit Without dependents With maximum number ofdependents allowed
15.00
18.00
20.00
22.00
22.50
22.75
24.00
25.00
26.00
30.00
31.00
32.00
33.00
36.00
37.00
40.00
not specified
1
1
17
3
1
1
2
23
2
1
2
11
•an •T^\
^0 •v»
Table V
NUMBER OF STATES ACCORDING TO
SPECIFIED MINIMUM BENEFIT AMOUNTS
(September 1, 1949)
Minimum Benefit
Table VI
MAXIMUM DURATION AND AMOUNTS OF BENEFITS
(September 1, 1949)
Maxi-
mum
number
fits that thr average weekly benefit of $19.28 in July, 1948, was worth
only $11.11 in terms of 1935-39 dollars."^'
As we have pointed out before, the original unemployment insurance
laws were designed to compensate for about V2 of the wage loss suffered
during total unemployment. . . ."^ This amount was believed high enough
to perinit the worker to maintain himself, yet low enough to provide an
incentive to seek gainful employment. When the average weekly wage for
factory workers was between $26 and $30, as it was in the late 1930's, a
maximum of $15 was about V2 of the wages lost through unemployment.
With average weekly wages for factory workers now around $55,"* a maxi-
mum of $25 does not quite reach the standard of ¥i of average weekly
wages for the unemployed worker. In referring to this problem, the Social
Security Administration, in its annual report to the Congress, found that
benefits "have replaced, on the average, only a third of wages. . . ."^^
Many employers, however, are opposed to raising the benefits under
unemployment insurance. They are fearful that increased benefits will
reduce the incentive to work and will encourage workers to remain idle
in order to collect the high benefits. This fear has been stated by a state
unemployment insurance administrator as follows:
"If we are to plan wisely, we must plan for the good of all— not on
the basis of how much can business afford to pay as taxes, or how much
can labor demand as benefits, but rather, how much should be paid as
unemployment benefits in order to assist workers generally in helping
themselves to prosper more fully under our opportunity system. . . .
"Unemployment benefits should never be so large as to make them
an attractive substitute for wages, nor should they be so small that they
fail to assist the worker materially in paying for the necessities of life
when he has lost his job through no fault of his own and while he is
seeking employment."^®
Another problem is the difference in benefits paid in the various
states, even when earnings are the same. For example, the maximum
potential benefits in a year vary from $240 in Arizona and Florida to
$962 or more in Massachusetts, where the maximum weekly benefit is
practically unlimited when the dependents allowances are considered. ^^
In Massachusetts the average weekly benefit paid in 1948 was $22.85.
For the third quarter of 1949, the average weekly benefit for the nation
was $20.54. During that same period Utah, Michigan, Massachusetts,
and Alaska paid an average weekly benefit of more than $23, while
Florida paid only $13.76 and Georgia and Mississippi less than $15.^^
For the month of November, 1949, the average weekly benefit paid in
Illinois was $19.10; for the nation as a whole it was $21.16.^^
Although the states were given broad authority to determine their own
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benefits in accordance with the particular local conditions, critics of the
present system object to the variation in benefit payments which this
system permits/" They argue that even where differences might be justi-
fied on the basis of different conditions, they do not warrant as low an
average benefit payment as exists in some of the states.
A third benefit problem is in the duration of benefits. The percentage
of claimants who used up all their benefits rights declined rapidly from
59.69^ in 1939 to 19.2% in 1945, the year the war ended. This decline
was due to the high employment level which prevailed during the war-
time period; in 1946, the ratio rose to 38.3%, only to decline again in
1947 to 30.7%."^
However, there was increasing concern at the end of 1949 over the
rapid rise in the number of unemployed workers exhausting their unem-
ployment insurance benefits. The figures published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics show that 500,000 people exhausted their unemploy-
ment insurance benefits during the July-September quarter of 1949. This
was twice as many people as in the same period in 1948. In Illinois,
71,316 unemployed workers exhausted their benefit rights between April 1
and December 17, 1949."^
Arthur Altmeyer, Commissioner of Social Security, reported in Sep-
tember, 1949, that 30% of the workers collecting unemployment insurance
exhaust their benefits and that in some states the figures run as high
as 50%.^^ The problem is further accentuated if we consider that the
increase in the number of exhausted benefits took place in a period
of rising employment.
ELIGIBILITY AND DISQUALIFICATION
All states** require that, in order to be eligible for benefits, an unem-
ployed worker must be "able to work" and he must be "available for
work." This requirement is designed to limit the benefits of unemploy-
ment insurance to regular members of the labor force.
In Illinois recent amendments to the law have attempted to clarify
these eligibility requirements. A worker must now be "actively seeking
work during the period for which he seeks benefits." A worker is con-
sidered unavailable for work if he moves to and remains in a locality
"where opportunities for work are substantially less favorable than those
in the locality he has left." A woman is considered to be unable to work
and unavailable for work if she voluntarily left her job because of preg-
nancy. In any event a woman is considered to be unable to work and
unavailable for work during the 13 weeks before and the 4 weeks fol-
lowing childbirth. All persons who leave work voluntarily to marry, except
those who become the sole support of themselves and their families, are
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unavailable for work. Persons leaving employment voluntarily because of
family problems are considered unavailable for work.*^ Many other states
have similar provisions.
Although otherwise eligible, a worker may be disqualified from re-
ceiving benefits under certain other conditions. The most important of
these conditions, other than fraud and misrepresentation, are:
1. voluntarily leaving the job without good cause
2. discharge for misconduct connected with the work
3. refusal of suitable work
4. unemployment due to a labor dispute
In all the states, disqualification for one or more of the reasons re-
sults in a postponement of benefits. In some states the penalty may be
cancellation of benefit rights or a reduction in the amount of benefits.
The postponement period varies among the states. This idea of a limited
disqualification period is based on the theory that after a certain length
of time the reason for the worker's unemployment is due to general lack
of jobs rather than the reason for which he was disqualified.
In other states, if a worker has been disqualified, he loses benefits for
the entire period of unemployment. The states do this by canceling all or
some of the worker's wage credits. Or, they may require an additional
amount of work or wages from the disqualified worker. Under this type
of provision, workers who are disqualified are denied benefits for the
period of unemployment immediately following the disqualification and
lose accumulated wage credits for the future.
Eligibility Trends
Both the legislative definitions of the major causes of disqualification
and the penalties vary in the states. A general trend toward more rigid
eligibility requirements and more severe penalties is becoming clear.**'
The Advisory Council on Social Security pointed out that, "in 1937,
seven states reduced or canceled benefit rights for causes other than fraud
or misrepresentation; in 1940, twelve; and in 1948, twenty-two."*^ The
other states, including Illinois, postpone benefits for a given length of
time in the event of disqualification for causes other than fraud or mis-
representation. In Illinois, the benefits are postponed for the week during
which the disqualifying act occurred, plus six additional weeks.
The Advisory Council contends also, that there have been an increas-
ing number of administrative decisions and legislative provisions, "which
deny benefits to individuals who are genuinely unemployed through no
fault of their own and are ready, willing, and able to accept suitable
work." It gave as an example the interpretation of "misconduct."*® Some
states have tended to say if a worker is discharged for inability to do the
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work, that is "misconduct" and he is disqualified from benefits. Many
people feel, however, that in most cases inability to perform a job satis-
factorily is due to inadequate training and poor placement. These causes
are not the responsibility of the worker alone, but of management as
well. The argument continues that to deny benefits to a worker unable
to perform a job is to punish persons involuntarily unemployed and this
is contrary to a fundamental principle of unemployment insurance. The
criticism voiced by the Advisory Council is therefore twofold. First, it
sees no justification for the severe penalties inflicted in the cases of dis-
qualification; second, it condemns the interpretations of "misconduct"
which make inability to do the work a basis for disqualifying a worker.^''
Labor's View
Representatives of organized labor have also criticized provisions in
18 states which deny benefits to workers who voluntarily leave the job
for good personal reasons. ^° For example, if a worker has to move from
a cold climate to a state with a warm, dry climate because of ill health
in his family he would be disqualified from benefits in 18 states.
A glance at some disqualification figures emphasizes the seriousness
of this problem. In 1948, one out of ten claimants was disqualified either
because he was unable to work or was unavailable for work. Another one
out of ten was disqualified on the contention that he left his job volun-
tarily, refused suitable employment, or had been discharged for miscon-
duct. These figures do not include disqualification resulting from labor
disputes. ^^
Employer's View
Employers contend these rigid eligibility requirements must stay in the
laws if the principles of unemployment insurance are to be maintained.
The Social Security Committee of the Illinois State Chamber of Com-
merce has endorsed measures which would have further tightened the
eligibility requirements and increased the penalties of disqualification in
that state. ^^ Another employer viewpoint: "Employers look upon un-
employment compensation as an insurance program, not as a welfare
dole. Under the insurance concept the beneficiary entitled to benefits is
that individual who has been laid off because the employer is no longer
able to provide work for him, but who remains in the labor market, is
actively seeking work, but cannot find suitable employment."^^
Employers give many examples of abuses of the system which allegedly
require correction by more rigid interpretation of the disqualification
provisions and severer penalties for the disqualified. The Illinois State
Chamber of Commerce Social Security Department cites the following
report. "One of our secretaries was dismissed by our office because our
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volume of work did not warrant keeping her. We helped her to get
relocated in similar work, but she quit after three months and collected
her unemployment compensation from our account for the full length
of time. The very week her unemployment compensation ran out, she
started working again. Here again, the girl was married and apparently
found it to be quite a satisfactory arrangement to stay home and keep
house and collect a salary." '* Other abuses are alleged to exist where
farmers work in factories during the winter and then collect benefits after
they quit to return to the farm in time for spring plowing.
Another example which has been given to demonstrate the need for
more rigid and efficient application of the eligibility rules involves the
extent to which fraud exists. "An automobile plant in Detroit . . . has
recently been auditing the benefit charges made against its account. They
found that 1,327 of their employees had received benefit checks covering
up to 13 weeks during which they had been fully employed by this same
company."^^
These examples indicate the types of criticism which various groups
have raised against present practices.
In answer to these charges of abuses, however, unemployment in-
surance administrators say the examples are misleading because : ( 1 ) if
the incidents actually occurred, they may involve laxity in administra-
tion rather than defects in the laws themselves, or (2) the examples, as
given, may leave out additional facts which might justify the payment of
benefits, or (3) they are simply "impossible" under existing provisions of
state unemployment compensation laws.^*^
NON- OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE
We noted above that, in all states, a worker must be able to work,
as well as available for work, before he can receive unemployment in-
surance benefits.
Our nation-wide social security program now in efTect provides some
protection against the risks of unemployment, old age, and death. All
states also provide— through workmen's compensation laws— protec-
tion against the risks of medical expenses and loss of income resulting
from injury on the job, or illness caused by the work itself.
Yet there is no nation-wide protection for a worker who is unable to
work because of ordinary injury or illness ?iot resulting from the job.
Such non-occupational disability is a serious problem for workers be-
cause it often means medical expenses in addition to loss of income.^'
Existing Laws
Five states have attempted to fill this gap.^^ Rhode Island was the first
(in 1942) to enact legislation which set up a system of benefit payments
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for non-occupational illness or injury. Then, in 1946 Congress amended
the Social Security Act to provide that, if a state collected funds from
employees, those funds might be used to pay disability benefits. Since
then, three other states have adopted disability insurance laws: Cali-
fornia in 1946, New Jersey in 1948, and New York in 1949. Washington
enacted a similar law in 1949 which, if approved in a state-wide refer-
endum in November, 1950, will go into effect the following month.
In all of these states except New York, disability benefits are ad-
ministered by and coordinated with the unemployment insurance system.
In New York a separate system of non-occupational disability insurance
is administered by the state Workmen's Compensation Board. The New
York law requires a contribution by both employers and employees. The
amount of benefits vary from $10 to $26 for 13 weeks.
Laws in the other four states follow closely the unemployment in-
surance laws as to earnings, base periods, benefit years, and administrative
arrangements.
In Rhode Island, Washington, and California employees pay a 1%
tax on wages into the fund. In New Jersey the system is financed also by
a 1% tax on wages, but with a .75% contribution from the employees and
a .25% contribution from the employers.
New Jersey, California, New York, and Washington also permit an
employer to provide disability insurance coverage through a private in-
surance plan. Rhode Island is the only one of these states which does not
provide for the substitution of a private voluntary plan for the state
system.
Views on Disability Insurance
There is a great deal of controversy as to the place of temporary
disability insurance in the broad social security picture. ^^ In 1945, the
comprehensive Murray-Wagner-Dingell social security bill proposed a
broad federal program of social insurance including a system of temporary
and permanent disability protection. Although this legislation was not
passed, the disability clauses were re-introduced in the 81st Congress, and
passed by the House of Representatives. This bill provides for the inte-
gration of a permanent and total disability insurance in the broad system
of old age and survivor's insurance. It does not attempt to cover tempo-
rary disability.*^** As this is written, however, no action has been taken
on the bill by the Senate.
Proposals have also been advanced for a national program to combine
temporary disability insurance with unemployment insurance as in the
four states mentioned above. An argument in favor of this method is
that , it permits the use of the same administrative machinery for both
programs.
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There is also sharp disagreement as to the type of state system that
should be adopted. Some advocate an exclusively state-operated system
of insurance, as in Rhode Island; others would permit a state-operated
system with provisions for substituting approved private plans. Those who
advocate an exclusively state-operated plan list its advantages as fol-
lows : ®^
1
.
It represents a sound social insurance approach since it is the widest
possible pooling of risk.
2. The same records and reports can be used for both unemployment
and disability insurance, thereby reducing additional expense.
3. A greater proportion of funds are available for benefits since the
cost of private insurance advertising and salesmen's commissions are
eliminated.
Those who prefer a state program combined with private plans give
these reasons : ^^
1. It would provide universal and continuous coverage while per-
mitting adjustment to individual situations, so that workers can obtain
benefits above the statutory level.
2. The competition between the state and private plans would stimu-
late greater economy and efficiency in the administration of both plans.
There is disagreement also as to the role of the states and the federal
government in disability insurance.®^ Several alternatives short of com-
plete federalization have been suggested. The federal government could
pay the administrative expenses as it now pays such expenses for unem-
ployment insurance. It can levy a payroll tax similar to that levied under
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and permit employers in those
states which enact disability insurance laws to credit contributions paid
under such legislation against the federal payroll tax.
Some say that temporary disability insurance should be under the
complete control of the federal government. They say that a federal sys-
tem can provide workers with uniform protection against loss of wages
due to disability regardless of residence or employment. They also argue
that a program of temporary disability insurance can be coordinated with
a federal system of permanent disability insurance, thereby avoiding du-
plication and overlapping of records, rehabilitation services, stafTs, and
procedures. Permanent disability insurance as well as the temporary dis-
ability insurance, it is maintained, must be integrated in the broader
federal social securitv scheme.^*
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FINANCING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
One of the objectives of the original unemployment insurance act was
to encourage stable employment. "^^ In the original act, Congress provided
a money incentive for employers to keep their workers on the job. The
act allowed the states to set up "experience-rating" schemes so that an
employer paid less taxes into the fund if fewer people who had been
employed by him applied for unemployment insurance benefits.
The unemployment insurance program began during an upswing in
the business cycle. Payrolls increased in size with more people working.
Increasingly, fewer people were unemployed. And, during the first two
years of the program funds accumulated while no benefits were paid
out.
The war and full employment were also important factors. In ad-
dition, the Veterans Readjustment Allowances saved much money for
the fund. Many veterans chose GI benefits rather than civilian benefits,
probably because of the no-waiting period. However, by the end of 1949,
the fund showed a decline. (See Table VII on the preceding page.)*^®
This changing trend in the last few years is caused by three major fac-
tors : ( 1 ) larger benefits paid for longer periods of time, ( 2 ) more people
receiving benefits, and (3) smaller contributions paid by employers.
Table Vlll«'
BENEFITS PAID, 1948-49
Fiscal Average Number of People
Year Ending Receiving Benefits Average Weekly Total Amount of
June 30, in One Week Benefit Benefits Paid
1948 814,000 $18.99 $ 756,000,000
1949 1,187,000 S20.06 $1,184,000,000
The amount of benefits paid out have increased considerably in the
last two years (see Table VIII). During the same two-year period,
employer contributions to the fund have decreased. Under the original
experience-rating formulas, the tax rate for employers should have in-
creased as a result of the greater number of people claiming benefits.
But many state legislatures have enacted amendments to their laws which
resulted in a lower tax rate. For example, Virginia lowered its minimum
rate from 1.0% to .3%; Kentucky reduced its minimum to 0.9%; New
York, with a 2.2% average rate in 1947 — the highest for any state with
experience rating— lowered the rate to 1.3% in 1948; Wisconsin dropped
from 1.0% to .5%; Connecticut from 1.9% to 0.3%. In those states
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v\ hich made no legislative changes, eleven had increases in rates, five had
lower rates, and nine had no appreciable change.^^
In 1948, the average employer contribution rate was 1.0%. The
minimum possible under the Illinois law is .5%.'"^
Table IX demonstrates the trend towards reduced contribution rates
in the states.
Arguments Against Experience Rating
Critics of experience-rating contend that it lowers the contribution
rate during periods of high employment when employers are best pre-
pared to pay the tax, and raises the tax during periods of unemployment
Table IX
AVERAGE EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION RATES'*^
UNDER EXPERIENCE- RATING
Year
Critics also say the inadequacies of coverage and the rigid ehgibility
requirements are caused by experience-rating. Under most of the plans
now in operation the employer contribution rate is tied in some way to the
benefits paid to former employers. The employer contribution rate will be
lower if the benefit amounts paid are small, if they are paid for a short
time, and if there are fewer persons receiving benefits. It is, therefore,
in the financial interest of the employer, these critics maintain, to chal-
lenge and fight most efforts to liberalize the provisions of the unemploy-
ment insurance laws.^^
Another argument is that experience-rating is an incentive for em-
ployers to fire a worker before he can qualify for unemployment insur-
ance benefits— that experience-rating tends to stabilize unemployment
instead of employment.'* In this connection, it may be noted that five
states, Alaska, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington, have
devised schemes that eliminate the direct relationship between benefits
paid and the employer contribution rate. The experience rating plans in
these states base the rates on percentage declines in the total payroll
over a period of time.'^^
Arguments For Experience Rating
Defenders of experience-rating point to the reserve accumulated
under the existing method of finance. In response to charges that experi-
ence-rating is an obstacle to the liberalization of the unemployment insur-
ance system, experience-rating advocates point to the increases in benefits
and duration that have taken place under experience-rating. They assert
that experience-rating is the primary means by which employers' interest
in unemployment insurance is maintained. Without the employer par-
ticipation, they fear that the system would become a politically expedient
handout of money. They point out that employers have an important
function in guarding against inefficiency and other abuses of the system.
For the employer, experience-rating also affords the opportunity and
incentive for individual action to stabilize employment— one of the
objectives of unemployment insurance.'''
An official of a large automotive manufacturing company reported
that the total number of man-days lost because of model changes be-
tween 1941 and 1948 had been reduced by more than 80%. He further
stated that "the incentive of experience rating was one of the strong
motivating influences spurring everyone on toward the attainment of that
objective through better planning, better scheduling, and the application
of a world of ingenuity in meeting problems as they arose.
"^"
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SHOULD THE FEDERAL- STATE SYSTEM BE CHANGED?
An important problem is whether or not the existing federal-state
system is the best method of dealing with unemployment insurance.
Supporters of the present system point to the advances made by the
states under it, particularly in coverage and benefits.'^ The federal gov-
ernment, they say, has not done much in improving unemployment in-
surance. They point out that the federal government has not even
extended coverage to federal employees; it is, therefore, inadvisable to
depend upon the federal government to liberalize the system. In addition,
there is general hostility to the further growth of what many consider to
be a cumbersome federal bureaucracy. The present system, which gives
the states wide discretion, should therefore be retained since it keeps
federal intervention in unemployment insurance to a minimum.
There are other arguments presented to support these views: The
present system, allowing wide variation, permits the states to experiment
with their provisions. By comparing experiences the states can find the
most efficient and desirable methods. The broad character of the federal
standards also permits each state to adjust its unemployment insurance
laws to meet the particular conditions in the states. Differences in geogra-
phy, industry, incomes, wage levels, and population can be considered.
The advocates of the present federal-state system do not consider the
problems we have discussed earlier as seriously impeding the proper
functioning of unemployment insurance. They claim that unemployment
insurance was designed to alleviate insecurity arising from short-term
unemployment.
Some groups are now recommending that unemployment insurance
be made into a more effective bulwark against depression. Those who
want to keep the present federal-state system maintain that unemploy-
ment insurance cannot assume the dual role of a social aid and an
economic weapon, and continue as social insurance. They contend that
the problems of benefits and coverage are being met by the states.
The rigid eligibility requirements are defended on the grounds that
they limit the program to the area of "insurable risk." The question of
determining the punishment for disqualification should be left to the
administrators of the unemployment insurance program in the states, it
is claimed. In the area of financing the advocates of the federal-state
system also defend the experience-rating method on the basis of the
reasons discussed earlier.
Complete State Control
Arguments for giving the states complete control over the unem-
ployment insurance program are similar to those advanced for keeping
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the present federal-state system.'^ This view is held by those who are more
strongly opposed to federal interference in state activities. They say they
want to keep the program "at home" and "close to the people." They
would like to see the federal government withdraw from this area because
they say it is only a handicap to the administration of the system. In
addition, they fear that unemployment insurance will be absorbed in a
broader scheme of defense against depression, and the insurance prin-
ciple of the program will be abandoned.
Much freer state control of unemployment insurance would be ad-
ministratively possible if Congress were to provide a 100% offset of the
federal unemployment tax.®° Under the present arrangement 10% of the
3% tax goes to the federal government. It, in turn, provides the funds
necessary for the administration of unemployment insurance; but the
state agency administering the program must maintain a merit system for
personnel and adhere to certain budgetary practices. An argument ad-
vanced by the advocates of the 100% tax offset is that the federal gov-
ernment does not allocate all of the funds collected from the 0.3% tax
to the states. The states could utilize these funds not only in improving
the administration but in increasing the benefits and in lowering the
employer contribution rate.
Federal Control of Unemployment Insurance
The supporters of complete federalization maintain that the present
federal-state system does not recognize the realities of our economy.^^
Employment, prices, profits, and taxes are determined by national forces
rather than by local factors. The integration of our economy requires
that there be an integrated approach to the problems which arise from
unemployment insurance.
This group bases its demand for a federal system on the inability of
the federal-state system to cope with the problems which we have earlier
described. They argue that only a federal system can achieve social
equities and efficient administration.
A federal system would provide equal treatment for all workers re-
gardless of the state in which they work. It would mean using the same
formulas and standards for determining the benefits, duration, and
eligibility throughout the nation. The national system would also elim-
inate the serious problem of the inter-state workers who earn wages in
more than one state and, by spreading their employment over more than
one state, fail to accumulate benefit rights in any state. It would do
away with direct employer pressures on the states. It would provide for a
simpler and more economical administration and for a broader actuarial
base. The 52 different methods of reporting data would be replaced by
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a single simple form or use of the old age and survivors insurance files.
The national system could also be more effectively coordinated with the
broader national policy in combating any future serious unemployment.
It would also make possible the integration of the various phases of
social insurance.
The more specific proposals made by some labor advocates of this
view include higher benefit payments for the unemployed, provision for
dependents' allowances, an increase in the duration of benefits to a
minimum of 26 weeks, easing of the rigid eligibility requirements, and
the substitution of flat rate contribution for experience-rating. Experience-
rating, they assert, has been an obstacle to increasing the unemploy-
ment insurance benefits in the states. This not only makes for conflict
between labor and employers but also encourages competition between
the states for the lowest contribution rate.®^ They also propose the
extension of the social insurance principle to include temporary and
permanent disability.
The Social Security Administration has also supported a national
system of unemployment insurance. In its review of social security
activity for 1948, the Administration made the following observation:
"In the light of ten years experience . . . the administration remains
convinced that it would be simpler, cheaper, and safer to cope with wage
loss from unemployment through a uniform nation-wide unemployment
insurance system."^^
MODIFICATION OF PRESENT FEDERAL-STATE SYSTEM
There are those who believe that the federal-state system is basically
sound but that it requires some modification. There are two views as to
the direction of the change required. One is shift from the present tax
offset system to a grant-in-aid system ; the other involves keeping the off-
set feature but adding more rigid federal standards.
The advocates of a grant-in-aid method assert that it would keep
the most desirable features of the existing system while eliminating the
objectionable ones.^* Specifically, the proposal would eliminate the offset
features of the present system and substitute a federal unemployment tax.
The federal government would provide a 50% grant-in-aid from the
proceeds of this tax and this would be applicable towards the cost of
state administration and the cost of state benefit payments. The state
would provide the remaining 50% of the cost. It could then raise the
money in any way desired. The employer payroll tax with the experience-
rating factor could be retained or replaced by general revenues.
The advantage of this system would be that it would provide an
incentive for efficiency in administration and care in dispersing funds
27
since the state would bear half the cost. An incentive to provide adequate
benefits would exist since the federal government would provide half
the cost, and the employer would not be required to contribute any more
than the prescribed percentage.
Another advantage of the grant-in-aid system would be the sim-
plicity in financing as compared to the complex tax offset plan. The
employer would make out only one federal tax return for both unem-
ployment insurance and old age and survivors insurance. It would also
permit the states to continue experimentation in adjusting their unem-
ployment insurance programs to meet the needs of their particular areas.
New Federal Standards
In its report on unemployment insurance to the Senate Committee
on Finance, the Advisory Council reported general approval of the
present federal-state system. However, it found five major deficiencies:
1. The inadequate coverage (discussed earlier)
2. Benefit financing, which fosters competition between states in the
establishment of low employer contribution rates, and discourages the
adoption of more liberal benefit provisions
3. The irrational relationship between the contribution rate and the
business cycle (also discussed earlier)
4. The administrative deficiencies in financing administrative cost and
in meeting the problem of interstate workers
5. The lack of employee and citizen participation which limits their
influence in formulating legislative policy for unemployment insurance
The Council recommended establishing additional federal standards
for the states to follow in order that employers in the state may qualify
for the 90% tax offset:
1. Coverage: Take out the size-of-firm limitation. Do away with the
specific exemptions, particularly employees of non-profit organizations
and domestic workers in college clubs, fraternities, and sororities. Include
federal-civilian employees and members of the armed forces in the pro-
gram. And extend the program to protect border-line agricultural work-
ers such as those engaged in processing and packaging agricultural
products.
2. Finance: Adopt the contributory principle, which would require
that employees as well as employers be subject to the federal unemploy-
ment tax. They suggested that the tax be set at 0.75% of earnings up to
$4200 for employers and employees alike. This would stimulate worker
participation in the development of state legislation in the area of un-
employment insurance, the Council said. This worker participation, it is
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suggested, will offset the dominant position held by employers in guiding
unemployment insurance legislation and administration in the states.
To correct the objectionable features of the experience-rating method
the Council advised three standards which should be required of every
experience-rating state: (a) a minimum contribution rate of 0.6%,
(b) an employee contribution rate no higher than the lowest rate payable
by an employer in the state, and (c) a rate for newly-covered and newly-
formed firms equal to the average rate for all employers in the state.
These standards would reduce competition between states for establishing
low contribution rates and would also reduce the employer incentive to
oppose the liberalization of benefits.
3. To change the sometimes harsh disqualification provisions in the
states and to provide equal protection for all claimants regardless of
\vhere they live, the Council recommended adoption of a federal dis-
qualification standard. This would prohibit the states from: (a) reducing
or canceling benefit rights as a result of disqualification except for fraud
or misrepresentation, (b) disqualifying those who are discharged because
of inability to do the work, and (c) postponing benefits for more than
six weeks as the result of a disqualification except for fraud or misrep-
resentation.
Other Council recommendations deal with establishment of standard
procedures for handling inter-state claims, including tips in the defini-
tion of wages, the organization of a loan fund for states with low
reserves, and the financing of administrative costs.
President Truman, in a message to Congress, April 17, 1950,®^ called
upon the legislature to broaden the coverage and increase the benefits of
the unemployment insurance system. In making this request the President
cited the increase in unemployment from 2.5 million in the first three
months of 1948 to 4.5 million in the same months of 1950 and the
inadequacy of benefits resulting from the lag between benefits and in-
creased wages and cost of living. The President stated that "unemploy-
ment benefits today replace a smaller proportion of a worker's wages
than was the case when the system v/as started."
The President called for extension of coverage to 6 million workers,
including employees of small firms, employees of the federal government,
and workers in "occupations of an industrial nature connected with agri-
culture." He further proposed that a national minimum for benefits be
established to provide a single person with approximately 50% of aver-
age earnings up to a maximum of at least $30 per week and additional
benefits for persons with dependents up to $42 or 70% of wages, which-
ever is smaller. The duration of benefits, the President stated, should be
for at least 26 weeks for the nation.
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In the area of financing the President proposed that employers pay
the tax rate on the first $4800 of each employee's wages rather than only
the first $3000, as is presently the case. He also urged that the receipts
from the federal unemployment tax go into a special fund to pay for
federal and state administration costs. This fund would also be used to
pay the cost of reinsurance grants to states who have used up nearly all
of their unemployment insurance funds.
Further proposals made by the President dealt with new standards
to eliminate fraud and misrepresentation in the payment of benefits. He
also recommended, however, that "over-severe disqualifications which
penalize the innocent along with the guilty, should be corrected."
Unfavorable reaction to similar proposals made earlier by the Bureau
of Employment Security of the U. S. Department of Labor were voiced
by some employers and unemployment insurance administrators. The
president of the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce referred to them
as an effort "to federalize unemployment compensation, boost benefits
and tax rates beyond reasonable limits, and effectively end state control
of jobless pay." He further asserted that if the proposals were approved
by Congress, "the total effect will be to knock out most of the provi-
sions which are designed to make unemployment compensation a form of
emergency insurance for those out of work through no fault of their
own."^**
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This bulletin has briefly reviewed the current issues in unemployment
insurance. It has also presented some of the significant trends and prob-
lems which have grown out of the functioning of the unemployment
insurance system.
Since 1937, the coverage has been broadened; yet 14 million persons
have no protection from the hazard of unemployment. Benefit amounts
and duration have been liberalized, but there is no agreement as to what
constitutes the "proper" level of benefits. The eligibility requirements for
benefits have been made more rigid with some groups approving the
trend and others opposing it. Employer contribution rates have been re-
duced through the mechanism of experience-rating, but this method has
become the center of great controversy. The federal-state system has
functioned since 1937, yet the ability of the federal-state system to meet
the needs of an adequate unemployment insurance program remains as
one of the basic issues in unemployment insurance.
There are sharply conflicting views on the numerous major and minor
problems reviewed. Despite these differences of opinion, however, the
principle of "unemployment compensation has truly become an accepted
part of the American way of life. . . ."*'
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